addressed. The direct impetus for the strike was Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel's decision to lengthen the school day and year without a proportional rise in teacher pay, but the strike tapped deeper concerns. Parents and teachers supported the strike in large part because they perceived "expert" advisors and the politicians they advised to be changing schools in ways that ran counter to parents' and teachers' own senses of what their children needed. For the past twenty years, Chicago has been a bellwether of the education reform movement, which has removed control of public schools from the hands of citizens and professional educators and placed it in the hands of expert manipulators of symbols. Like would-be philosopher kings, the businesspeople who sit on Chicago's Board of Education and the politicians who put them there speak of schools in terms of a quasi-mathematical knowledge of educational problems and their solutions. The parents and teachers of Chicago's children instead place their confidence in their ongoing experiences with the children they live with. Policy-makers and pundits tell us that parents and educators are misguided; that faith in experience-based knowledge of children and schools renders us dumb and immobile, chained to outdated conventions, determined to raise our children on myths because we cannot face the light of truth. 5 To the reformers' argument, Dewey's The Public and Its Problems provides a refutation that is as powerful now as it was a century ago.
thE chicago tEachErS StrikE
In September 2012, the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) went on strike. The strike was ostensibly prompted by a disagreement about the terms of a new contract, but interpreters recognized that this was no simple labor dispute. 6 Commentators identified two major themes underlying the conflict: labor politics and the education reform movement. Given the local and historical context, both explanatory frames seem apt. In recent months, initiatives to change collective bargaining laws had swept through Midwestern states, most dramatically in Wisconsin, where citizens joined unionized workers to protest for weeks around the Capitol building, but also in Indiana and Ohio. Although Illinois seemed unlikely to pass laws as restrictive as its neighbors, it was a good moment for a union to flex its muscles. Truck drivers, firefighters, and other unionized workers honked their support for teachers as they drove by the picket lines, and their solidarity seemed an invocation of longstanding labor movement ideals. Importantly, though, teachers are professionals as well as union members, and teachers' rhetoric around the strike suggests that they were motivated by the dissonance between their interpretation of what it means to teach children and the notion of teaching implied by reformers. In videos that groups of teachers posted on YouTube, they performed a rewrite of the popular song "Call Me, Maybe." "Our hearts are with our kids/Teachers just have one wish/To get back to our kids/The board is in our way," they sang, showing more enthusiasm for teaching-though on their own terms-than for political battles.
The board that was, as they saw it, "in [their] way" has not been democratically elected since 1995, when Chicago's public schools were placed under mayoral control. Chicago has been an epicenter of reform initiatives for several decades now, including the early roll-out of standardized testing, school closures and turnarounds, and the mass replacement of public schools with charters. These initiatives consistently disempower professional educators, as well as parents and other citizens. The strike expressed broad dissatisfaction with reform policies that teachers interpreted as a threat to their work as teachers and parents interpreted as a threat to their authority over their children's education. A majority of citizens, and two-thirds of parents with children in Chicago Public Schools, supported the CTU. 8 In response to CTU rhetoric that stretched beyond the simple matter of wage negotiations, Chicago's mayor Rahm Emanuel filed an injunction against the union, claiming that the strike was illegitimate because it was about "non-economic issues." 9 As it happened, CTU delegates ended the strike before the matter came to court, so that legal question was never settled. Whether it meets the law's definition of "economic issues" or not, though, the strike expressed a deep concern about the impact of economic issues on teachers' relations with the children they wanted to get back to. The surface issueshiring practices, compensation for longer workdays, the distribution of resources along lines of "merit," and the very definition of merit as success on standardized tests-represent the tip of an iceberg of unease about the changing terms of work.
dEmocracy and thE ProblEm of knowlEdgE A century ago, the changing terms of work sparked similar debate about the viability of democratic governance. As industrial capitalism replaced agriculture, it seemed to observers like Walter Lippmann that Jeffersonian democracy had ceased to be (if it ever was) a useful vision. 10 In Public Opinion, Lippmann argues that modern political theory has overlooked an essential question, that of "how knowledge of the world can be brought to the ruler":
In deciding who was most fit to govern, knowledge of the world was taken for granted. The aristocrat believed that those who dealt with large affairs possessed the instinct, the democrats asserted that all men possessed the instinct and could therefore deal with large affairs. If you were for the people you did not try to work out the question of how to keep the voter informed. By the age of twenty-one he had his political faculties. What counted was a good heart, a reasoning mind, a balanced judgment. These would ripen with age, but it was not necessary to consider how to inform the heart and feed the reason. Men took in their facts as they took in their breath. (Public Opinion, 140) What men took in, however, were stereotypes and propaganda, Lippmann argues, and this would be well-nigh impossible to correct. Modern societies, with their vast scale and technological complexity, cannot be governed by an educated citizenry, he contends, because policy questions are too complex for any individual citizen to understand sufficiently. The gap between "a good heart and a reasoning mind" and "good judgment" had by the industrial era become too vast for any citizen to overcome. In The Phantom Public, Lippmann raises the related problem of voter apathy, which he sees as a logical effect of the overwhelming complexity of information voters are asked to digest. Lippmann concludes that to bring knowledge to bear on public problems, politicians ought to be guided not by the whims of their constituents but by scientific experts.
Dewey responded to Lippmann in favorable reviews of both books in the New Republic and then more extensively in The Public and Its Problems. Lippmann provided an accurate diagnosis of the problem, Dewey thought, but not a good prescription. Lippmann shows to be an illusion the "'omnicompetent' individual: competent to frame policies, to judge their results; competent to know in all situations demanding political action what is for his own good, and competent to enforce his own idea of good." 11 Insofar as older theories of democracy were founded on that illusion, on the notion "that each individual is of himself equipped with the intelligence needed, under the operation of self-interest, to engage in political affairs," those theories are proven inadequate.
12 But Lippmann is mistaken, Dewey argues, about how knowledge properly informs public affairs. "Personally," he writes, "I am far from thinking that such considerations [as laid out by Lippmann], pertinent as they are to administrative activities, cover the entire political field." 13 The Public and Its Problems addresses those considerations with an alternative account of the political field and its relation to knowledge.
Knowledge, Dewey argues, is social, not individual. It is "a function of association and communication; it depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned. Faculties of effectual observation, reflection and desire are habits acquired under the influence of the culture and institutions of society, not ready-made inherent powers." 14 Where both Lippmann and the older democratic theory he critiques are mistaken, Dewey suggests, is in their shared assumptions that the knowledge citizens need is (a) an individual possession and (b) all of one sort. Rather, Dewey argues, the knowledge a democracy needs is a social possession, which arises through inquiry and communication around problems perceived to be relevant to the collective. Furthermore, as regards the knowledge that ought to inform public policy, technical expertise needs to be connected with practical reason. Because Dewey's answer is, as usual, quite complex, both pieces of this twopronged answer to Lippmann's case for technocracy call for exegesis. First, the assumption that for democracy to function individual citizens would need knowledge that they cannot possess is mistaken because it rests on a misconception regarding the relation between "individual" and "society." Because liberal political theory has conceptualized an individual who can be disassociated from all the social groups to which he might belong (e.g., church, guild, state), "there grows up in the mind an image of a residual individual who is not a member of any association at all." But even an entity such as a tree is not straightforwardly "an individual," Dewey argues, because it is made up of smaller entities, such as cells, and is part of a larger entity, such as its ecosystem. To call the tree an "individual" is to focus attention on one level of organization rather than others. For human beings, whose interactions with their environment are far more complex than those of trees, this is even more true. The misconception of human beings as unified entities then creates the "unreal problem" of how and why such individuals might choose to become associated. Once we replace this notion with that of individuals as always associated, the problem becomes that of "adjusting groups and individuals to each other." For this, knowledge is necessary, but the knowledge possessed within the group can be understood as a possession shared by the individuals who constitute the group.
Second, Dewey charges, Lippmann's conclusion that politicians ought to be guided not by voters but by scientific experts is mistaken because technical expertise is not the only knowledge relevant to political decision-making:
There is a sense in which 'opinion' rather than knowledge, even under the most favorable circumstances, is the proper term to use-namely in the sense of judgment, estimate. For in its strict sense, knowledge can refer only to what has happened and been done. What is still to be done involves a forecast of a future still contingent, and cannot escape the liability to error in judgment involved in all anticipation of probabilities. There may well be honest divergence as to policies to be pursued, even when plans spring from knowledge of the same facts. 15 In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey paraphrases the account of practical reason that he developed more thoroughly in earlier books, especially Human Nature and Conduct. His account, akin to ideas of "practice" developed by Wittgenstein and MacIntyre, is an Aristotelian phronesis for everyday usage juxtaposed with Platonic techne. Neither technical knowledge nor judgment alone will adequately serve the public in its efforts to resolve the problems it faces, Dewey claims, but both must be brought to bear. After pointing out the importance of judgment in a world of possibilities, the paragraph above continues, "But genuinely public policy cannot be generated unless it be informed by knowledge, and this knowledge does not exist except when there is systematic, thorough, and well-equipped search and record."
16 Technical expertise, in other words, is necessary; the mistake would be to assume that it is sufficient.
Judgment and scientific knowledge are fundamentally related, in Dewey's account, inasmuch as both are rooted in habit. "Thinking," he writes, "is secreted in the interstices of habits." Illustrating his account with workers whose jobs Plato and the framers of the Constitution would have recognized, he notes that "The sailor, miner, fisherman and farmer think, but their thoughts fall within the framework of accustomed occupations and relationships."
17 What makes the thinking of scientists different is that they "are persons of a specialized, infrequent habit."
18 The knowledge they accumulate is different from the judgments of a farmer because it is a more systematic, thorough, and well-equipped record of what has happened. To say this is not to attribute to scientific experts any expertise in judgment. In fact, Dewey argues, to the extent that science is isolated from everyday affairs, it is irrelevant to public policy. It need not be so, but if scientific knowledge is to have relevance to political decision-making, it needs to be in communication with the practical judgments made by all who are to be affected, which is to say made not by technical experts but by the democratic public. In Dewey's words, "The man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied." 19 The industrial age has radically altered how shoes are produced, to the point that most people can no longer make and fix their own shoes, but it has not altered the value of the shoe-wearer's judgment.
When the application of science is "rather to human concerns than in them . . . external, made in the interests of its consequences for a possessing and acquisitive class," Dewey argues, the effects are disastrous. Knowledge divided from judgment has played its part in generating enslavement of men, women and children in factories in which they are animated machines to tend inanimate machines. It has maintained sordid slums, flurried and discontented careers, grinding poverty and luxurious wealth, brutal exploitations of man and nature in times of peace and high explosives and noxious gases in times of war.
20
As compared to this list, the effects of contemporary educational reform seem relatively mild, but the point holds. Decision-making cannot be done well when it becomes the province of technocrats. This is not to say that education research has no bearing on the problems facing contemporary schooling. Rather, when it comes to decision-making, Dewey's argument suggests, the sophisticated knowledge accumulated by experts is useful only insofar as it is in communication with the judgments of those who, because they wear the shoes, can reason about ends.
nEw ProblEmS
Jumping forward to present times, Dewey's account of shoe-repair can seem positively quaint. After all, who has shoes fixed anymore? The wealthy may take their handcrafted Manolos to the cobbler, but since the globalization of industrial production has further brought down the price of new shoes, most people simply throw worn pairs out. To put it differently, now that the terms of work have changed again, do the characteristics of the post-industrial age render Dewey's defense of democracy passé?
In The Culture of the New Capitalism, Richard Sennett raises this concern. Sennett argues that changes in the post-industrial workplace have led to new cultural ideals that work against democratic politics. Although he mentions neither Lippmann nor Dewey, Sennett reconsiders the issues both addressed: the effects of technological advances on culture, the relevance of how labor is structured to how people think, and what this means for democracy. Sennett's analysis has three parts. First, he explains how "cutting edge" workplaces have changed people's understanding of work experience. In the past, Sennett explains, organizations adopted a pyramidal structure, in which a worker's gradually increasing skill was rewarded by advances up the pyramid, generally at a predictable pace. Authority at the top issued directives, which were interpreted by subauthorities as the directives were passed down to the workers at the bottom. Traditional teaching pay scales, which reward years of service and credit-hours of professional development, exemplify this interpretation of how skill develops through time and ought to be recognized, as does the traditional structure of school authority in which directives pass from board of education to teachers through several layers of interpreting administrators. In contrast, Sennett proposes, the contemporary organization is structured like an MP3 player, with an organizing force at the center able directly to access (without the mediating machinery of bureaucratic hierarchy) a vast array of possible workers. Although this structure promises worker autonomy, Sennett contends that it disempowers workers. It renders the organization inscrutable and unpredictable, and it diminishes both the relationships and the necessity of mediating interpretation that enabled the middle and bottom rungs of the hierarchy to shape the terms of their work. Furthermore, it changes the meaning of experience, as accumulated time on the job is devalued.
This newly possible structure depends upon a notion of skill as inherent merit rather than slow-growing experience. The prevailing model, Sennett proposes in his second essay, is meritocracy rather than craftsmanship. Although his terms are different from Lippmann's and Dewey's, from Plato's and Aristotle's, it restates the contrast between technical and practical expertise, techne and phronesis. In his discussion of merit, Sennett considers the SAT and the conception of innate talent it implies; while his example centers on student learning, the contrast he draws between merit as potential and craftsmanship as experience applies equally to how contemporary schooling treats teachers' development of professional skill. In public schooling, programs that put bright, inexperienced young people in classrooms and replace them within a few years by new waves of the same embody the merit conception. At the level of school buildings, so does the logic of turnarounds and school closings: a school that does not meet expectations is treated as intrinsically flawed, better closed and replaced with a new model than carefully mended.
Like Dewey, Sennett is aware that conceptions of expert knowledge are cultural effects of how work is structured that carry significant implications for politics.
While his sympathy for practice aligns him with Dewey, his attunement to consumer culture makes him also an heir to Lippmann's doubts. Industrialization, Sennett recognizes, made it possible for most people to approach their economic and political surroundings with a consumer's mindset. " [B] y the mid-nineteenth century," Sennett notes, it was "possible for a family of modest means to contemplate throwing out worn shoes rather than mending them." 21 Advances in technology and communications since then have intensified this shift from a craft to a consumer mindset. By the early twenty-first century, it is possible for a family of modest means to throw functional shoes out simply because they have gone out of style. No attention to how a thing works need be paid. Sennett worries that when citizens think as consumers rather than craftsmen, they "can disengage when political issues become difficult or resistant."
22 If a problem seems intractable, citizens can "throw it away" by shifting their attention elsewhere. Additionally, politicians and political parties come to seem interchangeable and disposable, which further disinclines citizens to hold them accountable:
Democracy requires that citizens be willing to make some effort to find out how the world around them works. Few of the American proponents of the recent war on Iraq, for instance, wanted to learn about Iraq. Equally striking on the other side of the political spectrum, few proponents of stemcell research have been curious about the arguments put forth by Catholic theologians against this research. The citizen-as-craftsman would make the effort in either case to find out; when democracy becomes modeled on consumption . . . that will to know fades. 23 With this analysis of how post-industrial consumer culture has reduced citizens' appreciation of how things work, an appreciation that is necessary for engagement with technical expertise to seem worth one's while, Dewey's response to Lippmann seems to lose its force. If the wearer of the shoe cannot be bothered to fix it, is there any hope left for the democratic public?
thE Public of ParEntS Lippmann, Dewey and Sennett ground their inquiries into how conceptions of expert knowledge affect democratic politics in the changing terms of work. Yet their analyses ignore an important kind of work that has changed relatively little: raising children. In the language of feminist theory, they forget to account for reproductive labor. The experience of raising children has, of course, been affected by cultural and technological changes throughout the industrial and post-industrial eras, but elemental aspects are firmly fixed. Children still need to be fed, kept clean, provided appropriate shelter, cared for when ill, and educated. They present a ceaseless array of problems that their caretakers need to solve. If they do not function as anticipated or otherwise cease to satisfy, children cannot be easily replaced. If anything, children are more irreplaceable than ever, due to medical advances that have made it possible for parents to expect all their children to reach adulthood. 24 And, as observers of contemporary family life have documented, contemporary American parents are intensely involved in raising their children. 25 As Sharon Hays argues in The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood, how parents think about the care of their children has not followed the same trajectory as other aspects of culture in consumer capitalism. 26 Raising a child remains a practical undertaking, which requires both mastery of the means and judgment about the ends. 27 Yet parents, too, have been subject to the creeping claims of scientific expertise working hand-in-hand with the centralization of government authority. In The Claims of Parenting, Stefan Ramaekers and Judith Suissa argue that "the parent-child relationship . . . has been claimed by certain languages and forms of reasoning, to the extent that it has become difficult to find other ways of talking about it and exploring its significance, at both an individual and a societal level." 28 As they document, the translation of developmental psychology and neuropsychology into parenting discourse scientizes child-raising and encourages parents to think of themselves as professionals, albeit inevitably flawed professionals in need of guidance by experts. The widespread understanding "of childrearing as something parents can no longer do without some form of expertise," they note, leads to "acceptance of the area of childrearing as a field for increasing government intervention." 29 Ramaekers and Suissa restrict their inquiry to the experience of parents, but much the same can be said about that of teachers, to whom parents entrust part of the work of child-raising. Like parents, teachers are expected to interpret their interactions with children in terms of a technical, universalized expertise and then, because their own expertise proves insufficient, subject their day-to-day engagement with children to centralized government control.
What the 2012 Chicago Teachers Strike suggests is that parents and teachers, in spite of their adoption of technicist discourses, and in spite of a widespread consumerist orientation, have not lost their political agency, at least as regards the education of children. On the picket lines, I heard a distinct shift from the language of psychology to that of politics. Teachers who, in routine school-parent communications, had expressed their plans for children entirely in terms of emotional intelligence, learning styles, and other scientistic discourses, were suddenly talking about injustice. As for consumerism, it too was trumped by politics when the problems facing children were perceived as serious. Later that year, when Mayor Emanuel promised iPads and air conditioners as part of his plan to close 10% of Chicago's elementary schools, parents were more furious than mollified, turning out to community meetings by the thousands to express their disapproval. The shoe was rubbing painfully, so teachers and parents spoke up. Members of the community perceived a problem in how their children's schools were being reconfigured; parents and teachers thought they ought to have some say in how this problem was resolved; and a public came, however briefly, into existence.
It will not do to overstate the case. When some fellow parents and I posted strike-related notes (e.g., librarian-recommended historical fiction about labor movements, the suggestion that parents eager to support the teachers bring doughnuts and coffee to the picket lines) on our children's class email list, other parents objected on the grounds that we did not all support the strike and therefore should not talk about it in this communal venue. Confirming Sennett's (and Lipmann's) analysis, a note advertising free bowling was celebrated as the kind of news it was appropriate to share. And of course, some Chicago parents did side with the Board of Education. The teachers I talked to were bothered by the inequitable distribution of resources among Chicago's segregated neighborhood schools, but mostly they wanted to get back to the classroom, and when the strike ended they expressed relief. When the strike ended, it left little concrete mark beyond the negotiated contract. Parents' and teachers' political engagement during the strike, in sum, does not disconfirm the concerns about depoliticization expressed by Lippmann, Sennett, and Suissa and Ramaekers. Yet it serves as a reminder that a democratic public, however fleeting, is still possible. Dewey never promises that a democratic public will come into existence, let alone permanent existence, even if conditions are right, only that it can. In this, the responses of parents and teachers to conditions in Chicago Public Schools during the 2012-13 school year suggest he is correct. Post-industrial society presents new challenges, but a public can still emerge.
Dewey correctly includes those who experience the effects of a problem alongside those who have the expertise to suggest fixes as necessary participants in a workable solution. Technocracy is not and cannot be democracy. As I have suggested in this paper, ongoing changes in how work is organized, tied to ongoing changes in what knowledge is recognized-which stood as the backdrop to Dewey's argument with Lippmann and have intensified since-give force to new challenges to Dewey's argument. I have used the example of parents' and teachers' exercise of their political agency during the Chicago Teachers Strike to support my case that Dewey's answer remains valid. However, his theory and its contemporary application raise a further set of unanswered questions. Who is to be included among those who experience the effects? (In a global era, what about problems more distant than a city school system?) And what if those affected fail to perceive the relevance of the problem to them? (In other words, what about those parents who preferred to restrict talk to announcements about free bowling?) These are questions I cannot hope to answer, only to set out as worthy of the communication and conversation that The Public and Its Problems calls for as the necessary basis of a democratic public. 
